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Most countries have separate pension plan for public sector employees. The future fiscal burden of
these plans can be substantial as the government usually is the largest employer, pension promises
in the public sector tend to be relatively generous, and future payments have to be paid out directly
from government revenues (pay-as-you-go) or by funded plans (pension funds) which tend to be underfunded.
The valuation and disclosure of these promises in some countries lacks transparency, which may be
hiding potentially huge fiscal liabilities that are being passed on to future generations of workers.
In order to arrive at a fair comparison between countries regarding the fiscal burden of their DB public
sector pension plans, this paper gathers more evidence on public sector pension plans regarding the
type of pension promise and quantifies the future tax burden related to these pension promises. The
reported liabilities are recalculated using both a fair value approach (local market discount rates) and
a common, fixed discount rate across all countries which reflects projected growth in national income.
We also estimate for a number of plans from a sample of OECD countries the size of the net unfunded
liabilities in fair value terms as of the end of 2008. This fiscal burden can also be interpreted as the
implicit pension debt in fair value terms.
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FUNDING IN PUBLIC SECTOR PENSION PLANS - INTERNATIONAL EVIDENCE 
By Eduard Ponds, Clara Severinson and
 Juan Yermo 
1 
Section 1. Introduction 
In many countries the sustainability of fiscal policies is being questioned. A major driving force of 
this growing concern is age-related expenditure, such as health care and social security spending (public 
pensions). A sometimes overlooked reason for the sustainability problems, however, involves the pensions 
for government employees. In most countries there are separate pension plans for public sector employees. 
Traditionally, these specific arrangements are justified because they guarantee the security, integrity and 
independence of the employees and because they contribute to the attractiveness of a career in the civil 
service
2. General findings from research indicate that compared to pensions in the private sector, public 
sector pensions tend to offer more generous terms and feature lower funding levels (Palacios and 
Whitehouse 2006).  
Reforms have been undertaken in many countries. These reforms have been oriented at bringing 
remuneration practices in the public sector more in line with those found in the private sector. Such 
reforms have generally involved lowering the generosity of public-sector pension schemes (e.g. Finland, 
France, Germany, Italy, Portugal, and Sweden). In some countries public sector workers have been 
transferred to the main public pension system (e.g. Austria, Chile, Czech Republic, Greece, Hungary, 
Mexico, Poland, Spain, and the United States), which in some cases include a fully-funded, defined 
contribution component (e.g. Chile, Denmark, Hungary, Mexico, and Poland).
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In addition, initiatives have been taken in a number of countries to introduce some degree of 
prefunding of public sector pensions via the establishment of reserve funds (e.g. Australia, Belgium, 
Finland, Germany, Ireland, and Sweden). Sometimes, however, fiscal pressures have overwhelmed the 
drive to prefunding as in 2003 when the Belgian government transferred the assets and liabilities of 
                                                      
1 The authors of this paper are Mr. Eduard Ponds of Netspar and Clara Severinson and Juan Yermo of the OECD.  
The authors would like to thank Monika Bütler, Michael Orszag, Jeffrey Brown, participants of the NBER 
State and Local Pensions Conference on Aug.19-20, 2010 and Delegates to the OECD Working Party on 
Private Pensions for their helpful comments. They are also grateful to Yuecheng Liu for research 
assistance. The study has benefited from a research grant from Netspar. The views expressed are the sole 
responsibility of the authors and do not reflect those of their organisations or the governments of OECD 
Member countries. The authors are solely responsible for any errors. 
2 Pensions are an important component of total remuneration. Pensions may therefore help to explain that generally 
spoken gross wage pay in public sector is lower than in the market as the higher pension entitlements in the 
public sector compensate for gross wages differences (Disney et al. 2009). 
3 There have been some important pension policy reversals in recent years. At the end of 2010, the Hungarian 
government decided to stop contributions to the mandatory funded pillar for 14 months and to introduce 
coercive measures to switch people back into the public, PAYG system. At the beginning of 2011, the 
Polish government announced that it would reduce the mandatory contribution rate to the funded pillar 
from 7.3 percent to 2.3 percent of salaries.    
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Belgacom, the former state-owned telephone monopoly, to the state system. The Portuguese government 
recently announced a similar planned assumption of the assets and liabilities of Portugal Telecom. Such 
moves, though worrisome if they lead to a depletion of the pension reserves, have also been justified as a 
way to unify pension arrangements between public and private sector workers. 
Pre-funding implies that, in principle, the costs of pension promises are borne when those pension 
promises are accrued. In some countries, public sector DB schemes are pre-funded, but in other countries, 
public sector DB schemes are financed on a pay-as-you-go basis or deeply underfunded. On the liability 
side, sometimes benefits are not provisioned for at all in the public sector balance sheets.  Those benefits 
that are accounted for in public sector balance sheets are not necessarily comparable to those provisioned 
for in the private sector as the assumptions employed may not use market-level discount rates, comparable 
longevity estimates or do not take into account the effect of future salary increases on benefits that have 
already been accrued. On the asset side, contribution levels are not necessarily sufficient. Finally, 
underfunding may persist for a long time in view of lax solvency regulations.  
The funding practice of public sector plans has received increased attention in the United States, 
where US state governments offer their employees defined benefit pension plans. These pensions are 
generally pre-funded to a high extent. A recent study (Novy-Marx and Rauh 2009), however, reports that 
the market-valued underfunding of the pension liabilities of the state pension funds amounts on average to 
24% of gross state product at the end of  2008.  While these numbers have been disputed (see e.g. Angelo 
et al. 2010 and Lav and McNichol 2011), they reflect a high level of concern regarding the growing cost of 
public sector pension liabilities. 
This study provides a survey of public sector pension plans outside the United States. In particular we 
are interested in public sector pension funds and their funding status. The calculations show that public 
sector funded DB plans outside the United States also tend to be underfunded.  
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of public sector pension plans in 
OECD countries. Section 3 examines specific public sector pension schemes in detail, describing the plan 
rules and financing mechanisms.  
In Section 4 which deals with the funding position of public sector pension funds, the valuation 
method for liabilities is a key issue for this topic. We compare the funding positions of different plans as 
disclosed by the plan sponsors, as well as based on market discount rates in each country and using a 
common fixed discount rate. The plans generally tend to be underfunded. In order to put the underfunding 
in perspective, we compare in sections 5 and 6 the size of underfunding with the present value of future 
payments of unfunded plans.  
The study stays away from the debate on whether and to what extent pension plans for public sector 
workers should be funded. Prefunding can be justified on various grounds. Firstly, it facilitates 
intergenerational tax smoothing (see e.g. D’Arcy et al. 1999), ensuring that each generation pays a more or 
less constant percentage of taxable income. Secondly, it can reap the benefits of diversification of pension 
fund investment, in particular into foreign markets. Thirdly, it can protect beneficiaries from the possibility 
of bankruptcy of the sponsoring governmental entity. 
At the same time, there are various possible justifications for underfunding such public pension 
commitments. First, to the extent that funding risks can be smoothed over time as they can be shared with 
future generations of tax payers, underfunding in market value terms may be an optimal strategy (see e.g. 
Cui et al. 2010 and Munnell et al. 2010). Secondly, a funding surplus might also mobilize pressure to 
increase benefits which in turn leads in the longer term to higher funding costs and so underfunding. So for 
taxpayers it is rational to aim at underfunding rather than full funding or overfunding. Moreover, a funding    
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surplus will enforce contribution cuts and once contributions are reduced, it is difficult to get them 
increased. The accountability horizon of pension fund management and politicians is much shorter than the 
horizon over which pension promises have to be met by adequate funding. This horizon gap may lead to 
pressure to underestimate costs and risks and to overestimate the earning capacity of assets. Thirdly, to the 
extent that prefunding leads to investment in domestic government bonds, a circularity in government 
funding may be created, with little added value relative to a PAYG system. 
Ultimately, therefore, there is no single answer on what the optimal level of funding should be for 
such special DB arrangements. Each plan should target a level of funding that is appropriate given its 
circumstances. One critical element of this evaluation is the relationship between the growth rates of 
pension costs and the contribution or tax base. A related question is how the pension cost should be divided 
between the government and employees. To the extent that the government is at least partly responsible for 
financing pension benefits, increases in life expectancy lead to a growing wealth transfer from private 
sector tax-payers towards public sector pensioners. The government’s contribution rate to the special DB 
arrangements of public sector workers has to grow in line with life expectancy. 
One key policy message from the study is that better disclosure and transparency is needed over the 
pension commitments made by governments to their employees, as currently, information on public sector 
arrangements is often partial or not readily available. A debate should also be opened on how to compare 
these commitments between governments, not only on a domestic level, but also on an international basis. 
This paper is a first step in providing internationally comparable data on such arrangements for a sample of 
OECD countries. 
Section 2. Experience with Pension Plans for Government Workers in OECD Countries 
Pension promises for government workers are a major policy challenge for four main reasons. Firstly, 
the state is often a country’s largest employer and as such, has large pension commitments to its public 
sector employees. Secondly, public sector pension promises are often of a defined benefit nature and tend 
to be relatively generous compared to private sector arrangements.  In some countries, although not all, 
generous pension promises appear to have been made to make up for relatively lower cash pay in the 
public sector as compared to the private sector. Thirdly, these pension promises are in some countries 
underfunded or not funded at all (that is, financed on a pay-as-you-go basis). Fourthly, there is as yet no 
internationally standardised method of reporting public sector pension liabilities in contrast to the 
significant disclosure requirements that exist for exchange-listed private-sector companies and that are 
quite standardised across many countries.  Practice varies widely by country, as does the extent to which 
the liabilities associated with these promises are disclosed and valued.  Such lack of transparency and 
valuation requirements that may not be sufficiently conservative could mean that huge fiscal liabilities are 
potentially hidden, to be passed on to future generations of workers. This section and the next section 
discuss in turn of each of these issues. 
2.1 Share of government workers in total labour force 
As can be seen in Figure 2.1, government workers make up a substantial section of the labour force of 
many OECD countries, with the OECD average at close to 15% of the total. In Norway and Sweden, 
government employees account for nearly 30% of the labour force. In contrast, in Korea and Japan 
employees in the state sector account for about 5% of the total employees in each country.  
If employees of state-owned enterprises are included, the level of labour force coverage increases by a 
few percentage points in most countries. Figure 2.1 also shows the relative stability in the level of 
employment in general government and public corporations as a percent of the labour force between 1995 
and 2005.     
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Figure 2.1 Employment in general government as a percentage of the labour force (1995 and 2005) 
 
Source: Government at a Glance 2009 
Data revised for Germany (2005 instead of 2004) - Governmental source 
Greece: data refers to 2006 - Governmental Source - Staff under private law has been taken into account  
Ireland: Governmental Source 
Source of the data for UK: National Statistics Office (FTE) 
Data for Slovak Republic: ILO and OECD 
Last data available for Korea: 2004 
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2.2 Types of pension plans for government workers in OECD countries 
Government workers’ pension plans can be classified according to three key criteria. Financially 
speaking, the main distinction in the administration of government workers’ pension arrangements is 
between funded and unfunded arrangements, but partially funded and book reserved arrangements should 
also be considered: 
  Funded arrangements are those where an independent legal entity is established to hold pension 
plan assets on behalf of the plan members.  Typically, assets would be held in a (legally separate) 
pension fund, although some countries allow public sector plan sponsors to purchase insurance to 
cover their pension obligations. 
  Unfunded, or pay-as-you-go, arrangements are financed directly out of the government’s 
coffers, though there may be reserves set up which are the legal property of the employer 
(government).  
  Another category may be considered, book reserved arrangements, where the sponsoring 
government recognizes a liability (debt) on its balance sheet which reflects the accrued pensions 
of its members, but there are no legally separated pension assets. 
  Some plans are partially funded, where the plan sponsor specifically targets a funding level that 
is less than 100%. The remainder could be unfunded (pay-as-you-go) or it could be book-
reserved. 
A second classification is whether the pension plan is specific to government workers’ or part of a 
broader arrangement, such as a national pension system. In the former case, it is also important to know 
whether the plan substitutes for or complements the nationwide pension system. 
Finally, pension plans may be classified into defined benefit (DB), defined contribution (DC) and 
hybrid pension arrangements. DB plans provide benefits that are ultimately guaranteed by the state as 
sponsor. In DC plans, by contrast, the government’s cost is limited to a prespecified contribution rate and 
hence do not create any future fiscal liabilities.
4  In some countries, the DC plans can be considered 
“protected” (Pugh and Yermo 2008), where the pension entity or provider guarantees or targets a specific 
rate of return or benefit, but there is no automatic claim to the sponsoring employer in case of under-
funding. In collective DC plans, risks are shared across the plan membership. Hybrid pension arrangements 
are those that offer a minimum return or benefit guarantee (e.g. cash balance plans) and may offer a 
variable (DC-like) benefit on top. 
Main features of pension arrangements for public sector workers in OECD countries 
Following Pinheiro (2004), Palacios and Whitehouse (2006) and further research, we describe in 
Table 2.1 the main features of pension arrangements for public sector workers in OECD countries. The 
table states whether such workers are covered by the main, national social security arrangement and 
whether they have a special arrangement (substitute or complementary to the general social security 
system). It also describes the main features of these special pension arrangements. In particular, it 
describes the financing mechanisms (funded with legal entities set up to hold the assets on behalf of 
                                                      
4 Some DC systems, however, have DB elements and may involve contingent liabilities for governments if for 
example, the state provides or underwrites minimum return or pension guarantees.    
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beneficiaries, unfunded schemes - though reserves may be built up – and book reserved plans) and the 
pension formula (DB or DC).  
Table 2.1 Main features of pension arrangements for public sector workers in OECD countries  
Country  Are public sector workers covered by the 
general social security system? 
Is the substitute or complementary plan for 
public sector workers DB or DC? Is it 
funded, unfunded or book reserved? 
Australia  No, they are excluded from the 
mandatory DC system  
The Australian Public Sector 
Superannnuation Scheme (PSS), a 
partially funded (with assets at about 
30% of liabilities), partially book-
reserved DB plan for employees of 
the central government, was closed in 
2005 and replaced with a DC plan 
(PSSap) for new workers. Each State 
has its own plan for its employees, 
most of which are funded and based 
on either DB or hybrid pension 
formulas. 
Austria Yes  DB,  unfunded 
Belgium No  DB,  unfunded 
Canada  Yes  There is a funded, DB pension plan 
for federal government workers for 
service after 2000 (book reserved 
before then). Provincial governments 
tend to offer specific, DB plans to 
their personnel. These plans are 
usually funded, though some are run 
under the book reserve system. 
Chile  Yes, except military personnel. The 
mandatory pension system includes 
a fully-funded DC pillar. 
There is no specific arrangement for 
public sector workers, except military 
personnel (unfunded, DB) 
Denmark Yes  Collective  DC,  funded 
Finland  No, but the rules are the same as for 
private sector workers 
There is an unfunded DB pension 
plan for central government workers 
(VaEL).  However, a buffer fund has 
been established and the target 
funding level is 25% of the VaEL 
plan’s liabilities.  There is an 
unfunded DB plan for local 
government workers (KuEL).  A fund 
has been established to cover the 
KuEL plan’s annual costs on a short-
term basis. 
France  No  DB, unfunded, plus a complementary 
(voluntary) full-funded DC plan    
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(Prefon) and a complementary 
funded DB scheme. 
Germany    Employees are covered by the 
general system and supplementary 
pension arrangements. Civil 
servants appointed for life are 
covered by a special pension 
system. 
 All plans are DB arrangements. The 
supplementary pension arrangements 
are partially funded. For civil 
servants appointed for life of almost 
all federal states as well as at federal 
level reserve funds have been set up. 
Greece Yes  DB,  unfunded 
Hungary Yes.  The  mandatory  pension 
system includes a fully-funded DC 
pillar. 
There is no specific arrangement for 
public sector workers. 
Iceland Yes  Collective  DC,  funded 
Italy  Yes  Some public sector employees (e.g. 
teachers) have a complementary DC 
plan. 
Korea  No, there are separate arrangements 
for public sector workers. 
The military, civil servants and 
university and school teachers have 
each their own unfunded, DB 
arrangement. 
Japan Yes  DB,  unfunded 
Mexico  Yes, for new public sector 
employees since 2007. Mandatory 
pension system includes a fully-
funded DC pillar. 
There is no specific arrangement for 
new public sector workers since 
2007. Older workers are covered by 
an unfunded, DB plan. 
Netherlands  Yes  There is a funded DB pension plan 
for government workers at all levels 
and education (ABP) and a funded 
DB plan for health care sector 
(PfZW). 
Norway  Yes  DB, funded arrangements for local 
government workers.  DB, partially 
funded, partially book-reserved 
arrangement for federal government 
workers. 
Poland Yes.  The  mandatory  pension 
system includes a fully-funded DC 
pillar. 
There is no specific arrangement for 
public sector workers. 
Spain  Yes  Central government workers have 
both an unfunded DB and a funded, 
DC plan. Some regional governments 
(e.g. Basque Country and Catalonia) 





Yes  There is no specific arrangement for 
public sector workers. 
Sweden  Yes  Arrangements for local and federal 
employees include both DB and DC 
elements. Arrangements are funded 
for federal government workers.  For 
local government workers 
arrangements are partially funded or 
book-reserved and partially pay-as-
you-go.  (For local-government 
workers, pre-1997 obligations are 
pay-as-you go, whereas post-1997 
obligations are funded or book-
reserved.) 
Switzerland  Yes  DB, funded arrangements for central 
and local government workers. 
Turkey   Yes, except military personnel, coal 
miners and school teachers. 
There is no specific arrangement for 
public sector workers, except military 
personnel who are covered by a DB, 
funded plan (Oyak). Coal miners and 
primary school teachers also have 
their own DB plan. 
United 
Kingdom 
Yes, although some are contracted 
out of the state pension system. 
There is a book-reserved, DB plan 
for civil servants of the central 
government and funded, DB plans for 
employees of local authorities.  There 
are also separate book-reserved DB 
plans for employees of the National 
Health Service, for teachers, fire 
department, armed forces and police. 
United  States  Yes, for most states and central 
government workers hired after 
1983. Some states maintain 
arrangements that substitute for 
social security. 
New U.S. federal civilian employees, 
first hired after 1983, are 
automatically covered by FERS, a 
three tiered system that consists of 
social security, a specific, unfunded 
DB plan and the Thrift Savings Plan 
which is a funded, DC plan. States 
and local governments offer mainly 
DB plans, which are often funded. 
 
Most OECD governments, with few exceptions, offer special DB arrangements for public sector 
workers, which in most instances are complementary to the general social security system. These special 
DB plans create a pension liability for governments beyond that already reported in social security 
arrangements. Table 2.1 also shows that at the federal level, unfunded (pay-as-you-go) schemes are the 
most common, followed closely by the number of funded schemes.  At the local government level, funded    
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schemes are more popular than unfunded (pay-as-you-go schemes).  Some schemes at the federal and local 
government level are book-reserved, whereas a small number of schemes target partial funding. 
Table 2.1 also reveals some countries where government workers have been fully or largely integrated 
into both the PAYG and the funded part of the mandatory pension system. Such countries include Chile, 
Denmark, Hungary, Iceland, Mexico, Poland and the Slovak Republic. With the exception of Denmark and 
Iceland, these are all countries that reformed their public pension system structurally, replacing part of the 
public pension with “carve-out” individual accounts.
5 Chile led such reform in 1981, including public 
sector workers in the new system (except the military, who maintained a special DB system financed 
directly from the government’s budget). The inclusion of government workers in the mandatory private 
pension system in Denmark and Iceland can be traced back to a long history of collective bargaining at the 
industry level. The mandatory private pension system in Iceland dates from 1974. 
2.3 Pension expenditure and pension liabilities 
Information regarding public expenditure on government workers’ pensions is readily available for 
most OECD countries. However, international comparability is problematic because of the way the 
information is reported. The OECD’s SOCX database, for example, reports pensions paid to former civil 
servants through autonomous funds as a private spending item (Australia (partially), Canada, Denmark, the 
Netherlands, Sweden and the United Kingdom). All social benefits not provided by general government 
are considered ‘private’.
 6 
A recent study by Müller et al. (2009) has collected information for selected European countries. In 
France and Germany, spending on pensions for public sector workers accounts for 17% of total public 
spending on pensions while in Austria it is 27%. The highest ratio of government workers’ pension 
expenditure to GDP is also found in these countries, as plans provide benefits that replace those of the 
standard social security system. 
 
 
                                                      
5 In all these cases, at least part of the social security contribution was transferred to the new fully-funded, DC system. 
6 This is in line with SNA (1993), para 8.63 states: “… Social insurance schemes organized by government units for 
their own employees, as opposed to the working population at large, are classified as private funded 
schemes or unfunded schemes as appropriate and are not classified as social security schemes. …” In 
practical terms, for pension payments to former civil servants to be classified as private, these payments 
have to go through autonomous private funds (e.g.  separate pension and/or insurance companies), for 
which the government does not make up the deficit on a regular basis (e.g. in practice benefit schemes 
which are defined contribution plans). Non-autonomous pension schemes (including pension benefits paid 
directly from the government budget) remain institutionally in the government sector.    
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Figure 2.2 Pension expenditure for government workers and social security compared (as % of GDP, 2006) 
 
Source: Müller et al. (2009) 
Unlike that for private sector pension schemes (if sponsored by publicly-traded corporations), the 
reporting of government workers’ pension liabilities is not yet standardized internationally, although there 
is an ongoing initiative to do so by the OECD and the IMF via the so-called system on national accounts 
(SNA). Some countries, like Australia and Canada, already require their governments (at all levels) to 
report their pension liabilities for their employees as a liability on the government’s balance sheet (if there 
are no associated plan assets, then these pension arrangements would in effect be transformed into book 
reserves). By making these debts explicit, these governments would formally quantify and acknowledge 
the future commitments that they are responsible for. 
Some of the more contentious issues regarding the valuation of public sector liabilities are the extent 
to which benefits should incorporate future salary growth and the discount rate to be used. In the private 
sector, such issues have been largely solved through the application of the International Accounting 
Standard Board’s IAS19 standard for pension benefits in the EU and other countries, and similar standards 
applied in Japan and the United States. The choice of discount rate for calculating public sector liabilities is 
a particular controversial topic because of the huge impact small changes in discount rates can have on the 
size of the liability.  
Much of the recent financial economics literature proposes that public pension should be computed 
using some reasonable government paper rate. However, there is an ongoing debate regarding the 
application of market-based discount rates, given that pensions are long-term liabilities, that there is no 
market for such liabilities and that there is no a priori expectation that such liabilities will be sold by 
governments or otherwise transferred to an insurance companies. Hence, to the extent that a government 
bond yield is to be used to calculate public pension liabilities it may be preferable to use a long-term 
average measure or an expectation of its future value, based on long-term trends in economic growth and    
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inflation. Actuaries have also traditionally adjusted such discount rates upwards to reflect the higher long-
term return that may be expected from pension fund investments in equity and other instruments. 
The next section of this paper examines some specific public sector pension plans in several countries 
in an attempt to highlight in more detail some of the broad concerns identified above. 
Section 3. Examination of Individual DB Public Sector Pension Plans 
3.1 Introduction 
The prior section of this paper highlighted some high-level policy challenges that are facing public 
sector pension schemes, namely the large size of the government as an employer in most countries, the 
relative generosity of pension promises in public sector schemes relative to private sector schemes, and the 
funding and disclosure of public sector pension obligations. 
This section looks in detail at specific pension schemes for public sector workers in a number of 
countries in order to identify how the broad-level issues discussed above impact individual schemes. Table 
3.1 lists the plans that have been examined in detail.  The plans were selected on the basis of availability of 
data and are not necessarily representative of the universe of public sector plans in the country. However, 
for a few countries, the pension plans selected cover a large section of the public sector workforce and may 
therefore be considered representative of the average public sector employee. 
Data on all these plans has been obtained from public sources, mainly web-sites, annual reports (either 
2008 or 2009 depending on availability) and official statistics. We primarily selected OECD countries 
where there are special DB arrangements for public sector workers, both funded and unfunded. 
Some countries such as Australia, Canada and the United Kingdom are characterised by a large 
number of individual schemes from various employers in the public sector, whereas other countries such as 
the Netherlands, the Nordic countries and France are characterised by large and harmonised centrally 
administered schemes.  In most of the countries we examined, countries have pension schemes for their 
federal employees that are separate and distinct from the pension schemes of other public sector 
employees, although in the Netherlands this is not the case. 
This report examines only a few public sector pension plans in each country. In the countries with the 
large centralised public schemes (for example, the Netherlands, the Nordic countries and France), this 
means that a large portion of the public sector has been covered.  In the countries with many individual 
plans (such as Australia, Canada and the United Kingdom), the report covers a smaller portion of the 
public sector.  Figure 3.1 below shows the portion of the public sector covered by the individual pension 
schemes examined.  This has been measured as the total number of active members in the individual 
pension schemes examined in each country over the total number of each respective country’s public sector 
employees.   
   DAF/AS/PEN/WD(2010)9/REV1 
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The pension schemes examined in detail in this report are shown below; the examined schemes covering federal pensions have been highlighted in the 
chart.  (The pension schemes covering federal employees are the dark-shaded schemes.) 
Table 3.1: Plans under consideration 
Australia Canada Finland France Germany
Hong Kong, 
China
Netherlands Norway Sweden UK




Australia - Public 
Sector 
Superannuation 
Scheme (PSS) - for 
federal employees
Canada - Pension 
Plan for the Public 
Service of Canada 
Finland VaEL / 
StaPL (federal 
employees)
France - Le Regime 
des fonctionnaires 
de l'Etat, de 





Hong Kong (China) 
Civil Service 
Provident Fund 
Scheme (a DC 
scheme)
Netherlands ABP
Norway - SPK - for 
federal employees
Sweden - SPV 
(federal employees)








(PSSAP) - for 
federal employees (a 
DC scheme)
Canada OTP
Finland KuEL / 
KompPL (local govt 
employees)
France - CNRACL 
Caisse nationale de 
retraites des agents 
des collectivités 
locales




Norway - Public 
Sector 
Pensjonskasser - for 
local govt ee's





Australia - The 
Commonwealth 
Superannuation 
Scheme (CSS) - for 
federal employees
France - Retraite 
Additionelle de la 
Fonction Publique
Hong Kong (China) 
Old Pension 
Scheme





Australia - State 






















fund (1 of 99) DAF/AS/PEN/WD(2010)9/REV1 
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The total number of active members varies greatly for the plans examined.  The greatest 
number of actives employees is in the French schemes examined at approximately 4.4 million 
members.  The smallest number of active members is in the Hong Kong, China schemes 
examined with approximately 157,000 active members. The total approximate active membership 
of the schemes examined, grouped by country, is shown below:  DAF/AS/PEN/WD(2010)9/REV1 
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3.2 What is the Pension Promise? 
One of the policy challenges faced by public sector pension schemes is that they tend to offer 
relatively generous DB pension promises, when compared to private sector arrangements.  These 
higher pension promises appear to have been made in a number of cases to make up for lower cash pay 
in the public sector, relative to the private sector.   
The first question is what types of benefits are offered by the individual pension plans that have 
been examined.  The individual pension schemes that we examined are mainly DB.  The plans in 
France, Germany and Norway are final pay DB schemes.  Canada’s OTP plan is final average pay, 
whereas Canada’s plan for federal government workers is a highest average pay scheme.  The schemes 
examined in Finland and the Netherlands are career average schemes.  The UK scheme for civil 
servants is career average, whereas the other examined UK schemes are final average pay schemes, 
although the government is considering replacing them by career-average plans.
7  The plans examined 
in Australia, and Sweden are a combination of DB and DC.  There are three Hong Kong, China 
scheme for federal employees:  Those members that joined after 1 June 2000 are covered by a DC 
scheme, whereas members who joined before then are covered by highest pay DB schemes. 
Members of the French pension schemes for public sector employees are not eligible for the state 
social security pension scheme, so the public sector pension scheme must therefore cover any resulting 
shortfall.  Most German civil servants are also covered by schemes that replace the general social 
                                                      
7 The Interim Hutton report published in October 2010 recommended also later retirement ages and an 
increase in employee contributions in all but the armed forces pension plan.  DAF/AS/PEN/WD(2010)9/REV1 
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security system. The pension schemes examined in Canada, Finland, and Norway are integrated with 
the state social security pension scheme.  The pension schemes examined in Hong Kong, China, the 
Netherlands, Sweden and the United Kingdom are distinct and complementary to the state social 
security pension scheme, although in the United Kingdom, some public sector pension schemes are 
contracted out of the state pension system and must make up the benefit shortfall. 
The second question is how do the individual schemes examined compare to pension schemes 
offered in the private sector in the various countries.  In Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Hong 
Kong - China, Netherlands, and the United Kingdom, the schemes examined offer more generous 
pension benefits than what is typical practice in the private sector.  In Finland, the schemes give 
similar benefits to those found in the private sector.  In Norway, the level of benefits is similar to that 
typically offered by large and mid-size employers. Small Norwegian employers, however, tend to 
offer significantly less generous DC schemes due to the government-mandated minimum pension level 
that was introduced in 2006.  In Sweden, the schemes examined give slightly less generous DB 
benefits than the scheme that covers most private white-collar workers; although the public sector 
schemes are more generous than the DC scheme offered to most private sector blue collar workers and 
younger white collar workers who also receive DC benefits.  
The question as to how the relatively more generous level of benefits in the public sector is offset 
by lower levels of cash compensation has not been explored in this paper, but could be the subject of 
further research (compare Disney et al. 2010 for a recent study for the UK). 
3.3 Disclosure and Financing 
Most of the plans examined appear to have disclosed their full liabilities, either in the financial 
statements of the employer or the state (for the plans covering federal employees).  Full disclosure 
seems to be provided for by the pension schemes examined in Australia, Canada, the Netherlands, 
Norway and the United Kingdom as does the complementary pension scheme for public sector 
workers in France and the Swedish plan for federal employees. 
Full disclosure of liabilities is typically practiced by plans that are book-reserved or funded.  For 
the plans examined in this paper this has been the case:  full liabilities appear to have been disclosed 
for the plans financed by book-reserving or funding, whereas the pay-as-you-go plans have had no 
disclosure of liabilities.  The one exception is the Swedish local government plans which practices 
partial funding/book-reserving and partial pay-as-you-go funding.  The portion of the liabilities for 
these plans that is funded or book-reserved is disclosed on a net of assets basis only.   
The following chart shows the financing method used by each of the examined plans:    DAF/AS/PEN/WD(2010)9/REV1 
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Table 3.2: Financing method of examined plans 
Funded Book-reserved
Partly Funded / 
Partly Book-
reserved




Australia PSS (federal 
ee's)
Australia CSS (federal ee's)
Australia StateSuper SAS 
Trustee Corporation (pooled 
fund covers four closed 
NSW public sector 
superannuation schemes)
Australia ESSSuper 
(emergency services ee's 
and state ee's of Victoria)
Canada:  Pension Plan for 
the Public Service of 
Canada
Canada OTP
Finland VaEL (federal 
ee's)
Finland KuEL (local 
govt ee's)




CNRACL (local govt 
ee's)
France - Retraite 
Additionelle de la Fonction 
Publique (Complementary 
pensionn scheme for federal 
ee's, local govt ee's and 
hospitals)
Hong Kong (China) 
New Pension Scheme





ABP (all govt ee's and 
education sector)
PfZW (health care sector)
Norway SPK (federal 
ee's)
Norway KLP (local govt 
ee's)
Norway Pensionskasser for 
local gov't ee's)
Sweden Sweden SPV (federal ee's)
Sweden local gov't 
ee's
UK Principle Civil 
Service (new plan for 
federal ee's)
UK NHS (hospital 
ee's)
UK Teacher's Pension
UK local govt Merseyside 
pension fund
UK local govt west 
Yorkshire pension fund
UK local govt Greater 
Manchester pension fund
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The total disclosed liabilities of the pension schemes examined in these countries, and in Finland 
and Sweden where partial disclosure is practiced, is shown in figure 3.3 below. It should be noted that 
these pension liabilities have been determined using the regulatory requirements in each respective 
country, and are therefore not directly comparable. Therefore, the chart below is only intended to give 
a very general and relative order of magnitude of the size of the liabilities for these schemes. 
The main schemes for French public sector workers and the German plan for civil servants are 
financed on a pay-as-you-go basis and no liabilities are publicly disclosed.   
In Sweden, the liabilities for the SPV plan for federal employees appear to be fully disclosed in 
the Swedish State’s financial statements
8.  For the plans covering Swedish local government 
employees, the story is a bit more complicated.  Pension obligations that relate to pension promises 
accrued by employees after 1997 are accounted for on the balance sheet (either funded or book-
reserved), unless they have been insured away.  According to Statistics Sweden, pension obligations, 
net of assets, for the Swedish local government pension schemes amount to 60.6 BSEK as of 31 
December 2009 (5.9 BEUR).  However, the local governments can choose whether or not to disclose 
pension obligations related to pension promises accrued prior to 1997 and most local governments do 
not provision for these pre-1997 liabilities in their balance sheets.  As of 31 December 2009, the value 
of undisclosed pension liabilities for the Swedish local governments amounted to 344.1 BSEK (33.6 
BEUR).
9 
The Finnish plans, KuEL for local government employees and the VaEL for federal employees 
are partly financed on a pay-as-you-go basis.  The KuEL plan for local government employees is 
financed on a pay-as-you-go basis, although a fund was set up in 1988 to cover annual costs on a 
short-term basis.  The VaEL plan for federal employees established a buffer fund in 1990.  Annual 
expenditures are paid for out of the national budget, and then 40% of those expenditures are 
reimbursed by the buffer fund.  Assets will continue to be accumulated in the buffer fund until 25% of 
the total liabilities of the VaEL plan is pre-funded. 
                                                      
8 The liabilities that are financed on a pay-as-you-go basis in the Swedish local government pension plan 
are not disclosed in the local government financial statements, but Statistics Sweden publishes 
the associated liability figure each year. 
9 Statistics Sweden, “Statement of accounts for the municipalities and county councils 2009.  Preliminary 
data from profit/loss statements and balance sheets”, 26 April 2010.  DAF/AS/PEN/WD(2010)9/REV1 
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Section 4. Funded public sector pension plans  
4.1 Introduction 
This section presents evidence on financial aspects of a selection of funded defined benefit (DB) 
plans in the public sector for a number of countries. (The selected plans are the same as those 
examined in Section 3 of this paper, plus some new plans.)  It is clear from the previous sections that 
dominant variety of financing approaches are used for pension arrangements in the government sector 
across countries.  Discussion on plan reforms may stimulate the transition to funded plans in certain 
countries (compare for example Maurer et al. 2009 for Germany and for the United Kingdom the 
Public Sector Pensions Commission 2010).  
This section starts with a comparison of a number of funded DB plans on three different bases. 
We find that funded plans generally tend to be underfunded and we discuss a number of arguments 
why this may be the case. To put underfunding in perspective, we compare the size of underfunding in 
funded plans with the financial obligations captured in unfunded plans of a number of countries.  
4.2 Funding and methods of valuation of liabilities 
Participants in a traditional DB plan typically accrue pension rights based on years of service, 
annual accrual rate and wage income over the career. The accrued rights give prospect on a stream of 
annual pension payments as of retirement age. These payments may be indexed for some reference 
variable, for example price inflation or wage growth. A pension fund accounts for the future pension 
payments by reporting the size of the pension liabilities. The liability of a pension plan essentially is 
the discounted value of this stream of future pension cash flows to the present.  
There has been a debate on which method of discounting is appropriate in valuing pension 
liabilities (Exley et al. 1997, Bader and Gold 2003, Kortleve et al. 2006, Waring 2009). For a long 
time, liabilities were valued using a fixed discount rate which may reflect the expected return on 
assets, but since the nineties of the previous century the economic approach based on fair valuation 
principles and a market discount rate has increasingly substituted for the actuarial method. The private 
sector for the most part no longer utilizes the actuarial method for disclosure purposes as 
internationally recognized accounting standards prescribe that companies have to report their pension 
obligations in fair value terms based on economic principles. 
For public sector pension plans, there is a large variety in discounting practice. Both the fixed 
discount rate method and the economic method are in use.  The liabilities that the examined plans and 
the discount rates used and whether the discount rates are fixed or market-related are discussed in the 
following section. 
4.3 Reported evidence on funding positions  
Table 4.1 informs about the financial position of a number of funded pension plans from different 
countries as of end 2008 as reported by the plan sponsors of the schemes. All monetary terms are in 
Euros. Assets are reported at their disclosed value. The value of the liabilities is determined by the 
discounting method. The information about the discount method used in the table shows up a large 
variety as to this aspect. 
The Netherlands has two public sector plans, APB for the sectors government and education, and 
PfZW for the health care sector. Like all other pension funds in the Netherlands, the public sector 
pension plans in the Netherlands have to report the fair value of their nominal liabilities. The nominal  DAF/AS/PEN/WD(2010)9/REV1 
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liabilities are the accrued pension rights without taking into account future indexation. The supervision 
prescribes that the discount rates for the various terms have to be derived from the nominal swap rates 
curve
10. End 2008 the swap rate corresponding with the duration of the liabilities for the two plans is 
3.56%. 
The United States is present in the table with the aggregate information on the value of assets and 
liabilities of all public sector plans (derived from Novy-Marx and Rauh 2009). The plans in the United 
States use the actuarial method as prescribed by the Government Accounting Standards Bounds 
(GASB). GASB 25 states that the discount rate should be based on “an estimated long-term yield for 
the plan, with consideration given to the nature and mix of current and planned investments…“ 
(citation adapted from Munnell et al. 2010). For most plans this expected yield turns out to be equal to 
8% or close to 8% (Novy-Marx and Rauh 2008).  
The Australian plan also employs the actuarial method and applies a discount rate of 8%.  The 
Australian PSS scheme for federal employees is partially funded, partially book-reserved, with assets 
at about 30% of liabilities.   
The Norwegian SPK plan for federal employees is accounted for using the Norwegian accounting 
standard NRS 6 which is similar to the pension accounting standard required by US GAAP for 
corporate plan sponsors.  The SPK plan is partially funded, partially book-reserved with assets at 
about 60% of liabilities.  As of year-end 2009, the market-based discount rate was 5.70% 
The pension plan for federal employees of Sweden uses market-based discount rate that is net of 
future indexation.  As of year-end 2008, this discount rate was 1.90%.  
The United Kingdom public sector pension plans are partly unfunded and partly funded in nature. 
Unfunded plans cover civil servants, national health sector and teachers. The 99 plans of the local 
communities all are based on funding. The reported evidence in the table therefore only concerns these 
local funded plans. The evidence is twofold. The first row for the UK plans is information for one 
specific plan, the West Yorkshire. The second row is an approximation of the size of assets and 
liabilities for all 99 plans. The reported value of liabilities is based on a discount rate of around 3% (= 
6% denominator discount rate minus 3% inflation rate). Cash flows are projected with an expected rate 
of inflation/indexation of 3% (approached by taking the difference between the yield on long term 
gilts and the yield on inflation linked bonds). The denominator discount rate turns out to be equal to 
around 6%, determined as the sum of the long term gilt return plus assumed outperformance of assets 
over the gilt return, being 2% for assets relating to preretirement service and 1% for postretirement. 
On average this corresponds with a denominator discount rate equal to around 6%.  
The French public service additional pension scheme (RAFP)  has been created as a result of the 
French pension reform law of August 21, 2003, and is operative since January 1, 2005. The scheme 
manages the additional retirement benefit rights of French government and local authorities civil 
servants and the staff of French public hospitals, through a fully funded scheme. 
With almost 4.6 million beneficiaries, 51,000 employers and contributions of more than 1.5 
billion euros per annum, RAFP is one of the world’s largest public pension funds in terms of 
members. The size of the plan assets and liabilities were relatively small at the end of 2008, at 6.1 
                                                      
10 The reason for the use of the swap curve instead of the yield curve of Dutch government bonds as proxy 
for the riskfree rates interest is that the swap market is more developed (more trade terms and 
many more participants) and so much less sensible for incidental market disturbances.  DAF/AS/PEN/WD(2010)9/REV1 
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BEUR and 5.4 BEUR respectively, as the plan is quite young after four years of operations.  The plan 
assets and liabilities are expected to grow rapidly.  The discount rate is 1.80%.  
Table 4.1: Reported evidence by plans in consideration (end 2008) 
Funding Funding Discount 
Country Plan Assets Liabilities Residue Ratio Rate
in euros end of 2008
Canada Public Service (31 March 2008) 70.0 66.8 3.2 104.9% 6.00%
OTTPF (2008) 62.1 68.6 -6.5 90.5% 4.00%
France Public Service Addi t ional Pension Scheme 6.1 5.4 0.7 112.5% 1.80%
Netherlands ABP (2008) 175.6 195.7 -20.1 89.8% 3.57%
PfZW (2008) 71.3 78.7 -7.3 90.7% 3.55%
Sweden federal (2008) 20.0 19.0 0.9 104.8% 1.90%
Norway [1]  federal (2008) 18.9 28.2 -9.3 67.0% 5.80%
UK [2] WestYorkshire 4.4 5.5 -1.1 79.6% 6.00%
Approx. all local government plans 317.8 542.1 -224.2 58.6% 6.00%
US [3] All state and local plans  1374.3 2110.8 -736.5 65.1% 8.00%
Australia CSS Super (31 June 2008) 3.0 32.0 -29.0 9.3% 7.54%
ESS Super (31 Dec 2008) 8.5 13.8 -5.3 61.5% 8.00%
[1] Annual report states at value assets: "fictituos fund'
[2]  UK has 99 local plans and approximation is based on the three biggest plans
[3]  Data US derived from Novy-Marx and Rauh (2009)  
4.4 Funding positions for different methods of valuation 
The previous section has clarified that funded public sector plans use different methods and 
assumptions for valuing future pension benefit cash flows. Differences could include discount rates, 
mortality tables, actuarial methods and disclosure practices.  Such differences stem from historical 
reasons and regulatory practices, but unfortunately, these differences in valuation and disclosure 
hinder a comparison of the funding positions of public sector pension plans on comparable terms.  In 
order to make these liabilities truly comparable, they would need to be recalculated using the same 
methods and assumptions.   
We do not attempt to fully recalculate the liabilities using the same methods and assumptions, but 
in order to make the liabilities at least somewhat more comparable, they have been approximately 
adjusted as if they were calculated using comparable discount rates across countries, using (i) market-
based discount rates based on the long-term nominal swap rates in each country and (ii) a fixed 
discount rate related to the expected return on assets held by the pension funds. Please note that we 
have made no adjustment for differences in other assumptions such as mortality tables, whether or not 
future salary increases are included in the liabilities and potential differences in asset valuation, so our 
revaluation can only be considered as a very rough approximation of a more “comparable” set of 
funding levels. 
4.4.1 Discounting methods 
There are different ways to arrive at a discount rate for pension fund liabilities. The choice of the 
discount rate can be related to the expected return on assets in portfolio. The discount rate can also be  DAF/AS/PEN/WD(2010)9/REV1 
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based on the characteristics of the pension liabilities. The former approach typically has been 
advocated by actuaries and plan sponsors, whereas the latter approach in general is supported by 
finance theory and financial economists (Bader & Gold 2003, Gold & Latter 2009). We make use of 
both approaches in comparing the funding positions of public sector pension funds.  
Liability-based discount rate  
Finance theory states that the appropriate discount rate should reflect the riskiness of the pension 
liabilities (Novy-Marx & Rauh 2010). When it is highly likely that pension promises to public sector 
employees will be incurred, then the appropriate discount rate would be the risk-free interest rate 
which can be derived from government bonds or from the inter-bank market for interest-rate swap 
contracts. Pension funds in the Netherlands for example have to value their liabilities using this inter-
bank swap curve. An advantage of using the swap curve above the government bond markets is that 
the inter-bank swap markets are well-developed and is free from credit risk pricing.  
A main drawback of fair value accounting is that the volatility of interest markets results in a very 
volatile value of pension fund liabilities even though the underlying benefit cashflows may not 
change. An alternative for fair value approach might be the use of a fixed discount rate related to some 
long-term average of the rate of interest on long government bonds or related to some assumed value 
as a good proxy for the interest rate on government bonds. Such a rate should also be consistent with 
long-term trends in economic growth, which ultimately determines the government’s capacity to 
finance pensions. 
Asset-based discount rate 
The asset-based discount rate approach typically relates the discount rate to the assumed rate of 
return on the assets held in the pension fund. The motivation may be found in the long-term 
orientation in funding pension promises. Pension funds invest for the long term so periods with below-
average returns can be averaged out with periods with higher returns. Private sector pension funds are 
hindered in following this practice as their sponsors are exposed to market competition and related 
discontinuity risk. This justifies market-based accounting to inform the fund’s stakeholders about the 
funding position instead of an asset-based approach. The government as sponsor of government 
pension funds however is by far less handicapped in following a long-term approach in funding 
because of its power to tax and its ability to survive the ups and downs of the business cycle and the 
stock market volatility. A fixed discount rate based on an assessment of long-term earning capacity of 
assets held, adds to intergenerational equity as yearly contributions are determined on an equal base. 
Such approach can also be justified if one considers that the benefit payouts are also volatile, as they 
depend on parameters such as wage growth, job turnover, and longevity whose future evolution is 
uncertain.  
What would be an appropriate level for the fixed discount rate? One may fall back on historical 
performance as guidance for the expected future rates of return. Looking back over a long period 
justifies the use of a relatively high discount rate (around 8% or even more) but restricting the period 
implies much lower average returns
11. The US state pension funds are allowed to use a rate of 8%. We 
                                                      
11 The US state pension funds earned over the period 1989-2009 on average 8.1%, however over the period 
1999-2009 just 3.9% (Lav&McNichol 2011). The Canadian Ontario Teachers pension fund 
reports over this period 1990-2009 an average return of 9.7% and over the period 2000-2009 
6.2% (website). The Dutch pension fund for the government ABP earned an average return over 
the years 1993-2010 of 7.1%, much lower than the North-America pension funds because of a 
more conservative asset mix (OECD 2009).   DAF/AS/PEN/WD(2010)9/REV1 
  25
base our calculation on a fixed discount rate of 6%, simply assuming that pension funds hold a 50% 
equity and 50% fixed income positions, yielding respectively 7.5% and 4.5%.  
4.4.2 Funding positions 
The revaluation of the liabilities makes use of the following formula (compare Biggs 2010 and 
Novy-Marx&Rauh 2008 who also employ this revaluation rule): 
Duration
iant var r 1
reported r 1











where rreported stands for the discount rate as reported by the plans and rvariant reflects the discount 
rate of the alternative valuation method. 
The term duration in the expression measures the money-weighted average maturity of the benefit 
cash flows. The duration also roughly corresponds to the elasticity of value of the liabilities with 
respect to the rate of interest
12.  The term duration is sometimes also explained as the percentage 
increase or decrease in a plan’s liabilities due to a 100 basis point decrease or increase in the discount 
rate.   
The actual duration of the liabilities of a specific plan is determined by the composition of the 
terms of plan liabilities, however we assume for all plans that the duration of the liabilities is 15 years. 
Generally speaking this assumed duration of 15 years is a quite good approximation of the duration for 
most funded DB plans, but indeed a duration of 15 year is too high for a very mature fund and too low 
for a very young plan.  
Table 4.2 displays four panels where each panel is subdivided into three different methods of 
valuation.  
The four panels are: 
  Panel A: Pension liabilities in billion Euros 
  Panel B: Pension liabilities as % GDP 
  Panel C: Funding ratios 
  Panel D: Pension fund residual as % of GDP 
 
 
                                                      
12 The change in the value of the liabilities L because of a change in the value or rate of interest r can be 
approximated with the following expression, with D as duration:  r D L      
Mismatch risk is the standard deviation of the growth rate of the funding ratio. The number of 10% reflects 
the thumb-of-rule knowledge of ALM professionals that a pension fund with a mix of 50% 
bonds and 50% equities, a duration of the liabilities of 15 years and a duration gap of 10 to 12 
years has a mismatch risk of around 10%.  DAF/AS/PEN/WD(2010)9/REV1 
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Each panel is subdivided to four different methods of valuation: 
1.  Reported:  
Liabilities as reported by the individual schemes, based on local regulatory practice. 
2.  Liability-based discount rate: inter-bank swap rate curve  
The “fair value” liabilities are our very rough approximation as to the liabilities of the 
individual schemes, determined using a market-based discount rate.  This valuation 
method is inspired by the Netherlands
13. As the market for government bonds in the 
Netherlands is quite limited in size and trading rates, the supervisor prescribes fair 
valuation has to be based on the nominal swap curve. We use the 30-years nominal swap 
rate as the market discount rate for nominal liabilities as the duration of a 30-years swap 
rate is about 15 years.  
Table 4.3 informs on the 30-years nominal swap rates end 2008 for the different 
countries. 
3  Liability-based discount rate equal to 4.5% 
This method bases the valuation on an assumed nominal interest rate on government. This 
rate is assumed to be 4.5%, being the sum of 2.5% real interest rate and 2% expected 
inflation. This rate is also consistent with long-term GDP growth rates in OECD 
countries, which reflects the growth in the tax base of the government which is the 
financing source for public pensions. 
4.  Asset-based discount rate equal to 6%  
The valuing of the liabilities is based on an assumed discount rate of 6% as proxy for the 
assumed rate of return on assets. We base our calculation on a fixed discount rate of 6%, 
simply assuming that pension funds hold a 50% equity and 50% fixed income positions, 
yielding respectively 7.5% and 4.5%. 
                                                      
13 One may ask why the Netherlands do not use real discount rates as they aim at full indexation of accrued 
nominal benefits. The actual granting of indexation depends on whether there is overfunding 
above the nominal value of pension liabilities. As indexation is uncertain and dependent on the 
funding position, Dutch pension funds therefore need not to account for the indexation ambition 
explicitly and can make use of nominal swap rates and not real rates. .    2010)9/REV1 
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Table 4.2: Funding position of funded public sector pension plans as reported by plan sponsors, using a market-based discount rate, using an 
assumed long-term government interest rate of 4.5%  and using a an assumed rate of return on assets of 6% 
  
Panel A Liabilities in EUROS Panel C Funding ratios
Country Plan Reported Swap Rb 4.5% ER 6% Country Plan Reported Swap Rb 4.5% ER 6%
Canada Public Serv 66.8 94.5 86.7 66.8 Canada Public Serv 104.9% 74.0% 80.8% 104.9%
OTTPF 68.6 73.0 57.8 51.5 OTTPF 90.5% 85.1% 107.5% 120.5%
Netherland ABP 195.7 195.7 153.6 138.2 Netherland ABP 89.8% 89.8% 114.3% 127.1%
PfZW 78.7 84.8 62.2 55.4 PfZW 90.7% 84.1% 114.7% 128.8%
Sweden federal 19.0 16.4 13.7 10.5 Sweden federal 104.8% 121.8% 145.9% 189.8%
UK WestYorks 5.5 8.1 5.5 5.5 UK WestYorks 79.6% 54.2% 80.8% 79.6%
Approx. all  542.1 795.9 393.6 542.1 Approx. all  58.6% 39.9% 80.8% 58.6%
US All plans 2110.8 4444.3 2252.7 2793.9 US All plans 65.1% 30.9% 61.0% 49.2%
Australia CSS Super 32.0 60.7 4.6 39.7 Australia CSS Super 9.3% 4.9% 65.0% 7.5%
ESS Super 13.8 27.9 13.9 18.2 ESS Super 61.5% 30.4% 61.0% 46.4%
Norway federal 28.2 34.0 22.8 27.4 Norway federal 67.0% 55.6% 83.1% 68.9%
France Additional 5.4 4.2 4.1 2.9 France Additional 113.0% 146.3% 148.1% 207.2%
Panel B Liabilities as %GDP Panel D (Residu) as %GDP
  
Country Plan Reported Swap Rb 4.5% ER 6% Country Plan Reported Swap Rb 4.5% ER 6%
Canada Public  Serv 6.7% 9.5% 8.7% 6.7% Canada Public Serv 0.3% -2.5% -1.7% 0.3%
OTTPF 16.4% 17.5% 13.9% 12.4% OTTPF -1.6% -2.6% 1.0% 2.5%
Netherland ABP 32.1% 32.1% 25.2% 22.6% Netherland ABP -3.3% -3.3% 3.6% 6.1%
PfZW 12.9% 13.9% 10.2% 9.1% PfZW -1.2% -2.2% 1.5% 2.6%
Sweden federal 5.6% 4.8% 4.0% 3.1% Sweden federal 0.3% 1.0% 1.8% 2.8%
UK WestYorks 0.3% 0.4% 0.3% 0.3% UK WestYorks -0.1% -0.2% -0.1% -0.1%
Approx. all  28.9% 42.4% 21.0% 28.9% Approx. all  -11.9% -25.5% -4.0% -11.9%
US All plans 20.9% 44.1% 22.4% 27.7% US All plans -7.3% -30.5% -8.7% -14.1%
Australia CSS Super 4.4% 8.4% 0.6% 5.5% Australia CSS Super -4.0% -8.0% -0.2% -5.1%
ESS Super 1.9% 3.9% 1.9% 2.5% ESS Super -0.7% -2.7% -0.8% -1.4%
Norway federal 8.8% 10.6% 7.1% 8.5% Norway federal -2.9% -4.7% -1.2% -2.7%
France Additional 0.3% 0.2% 0.2% 0.1% France Additional 0.03% 0.09% 0.1% 0.15%  
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Table 4.3: 30-year swap rates 










[1] Swap rate US reached low at end 2008.
Swap rate US end 2009 was 4.56% and end june 2010 3.71%  
Panel A of table 4.2 reports the absolute value of liabilities in euros which is strongly related to the 
size of the country.  
Panel B expresses the liabilities as percentage of GDP. The highest values can be found in the 
Netherlands with fair value liabilities around 45% of GDP (sum of ABP and PfZW), the US with 44% and 
the UK 42%.  
Panel C informs on the funding ratios for the three different valuation models
14. For the valuation 
method based on an expected rate of return of 8%, the plans in Canada, the Netherlands, Sweden show up 
high funding ratios far above 100%. Even with this favorable discounting method, plans in the UK and the 
US are severely underfunded. The level of funding is much lower for the alternative, fair value valuation 
method. Most plans turn up in severe underfunding. The best funded plan is in Sweden with a funding ratio 
of 121%, whereas Australia and US have funding ratios with indexed liabilities around 30%.  
Panel D finally expresses the pension fund residue (the difference between assets and liabilities) as 
percentage of GDP. These results can be interpreted as the implicit government debt comparable with the 
implicit debt position of unfunded plans. Underfunding implies that accrued pension rights are not matched 
in full by adequate funding so that future tax payers may have to step in by additional tax payments to fund 
the part of pension promises that are yet unfunded.    
The panels C and D of table 4.2 may suggest that underfunding in public sector pension funds is 
common.  This is the case irrespective of the method used to value the pension liabilities, although the 
underfunding situation is clearly aggravated when the fair value approach is used. However, it has to be 
recognized that these funding ratios are derived from values during or just after the financial crisis. It might 
be possible that public sector pension funds are financially sound and healthy in less extreme periods, for 
example for those funds in the Netherlands, Canada and Sweden. 
                                                      
14 Funding ratio is defined as assets over liabilities: funding ratio = assets/liabilities. Funding residue is the balance 
between assets and liabilities; funding residue = assets - liabilities.  
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Section 5. Public sector pension plans not backed by pension plan assets 
The liabilities of public sector plans not backed by pension plan assets (either pay-as-you-go or book 
reserve) can be perceived as a kind of implicit government debt (Holzmann et al. 2004). The costs of 
pension promises are not borne by the generation that has granted them but have to be paid by later 
generations of taxpayers when they lead to actual pension payments. This section provides an estimation of 
the size of this implicit debt position for the plans in consideration in this paper.  It is important to note, 
however, that government sponsorship of these plans and the relative guarantee that this may imply 
compared to the private sector may also be considered an implicit asset. 
Pay-as-you-go plans 
Some public sector pension schemes are financed on a pay-as-you-go basis. For these plans, no 
provision is made in the plan sponsors financial statements for any liability and benefits that come due are 
payable out of the plan sponsor’s general budget.   
The implicit debt position in pay-as-you-go financed plans actually is equal to the present value of 
future benefits based on the pension rights acquired in the past service years of plan participants, so the 
debt position may be perceived as the Accrued Benefit Obligation (ABO) of an pay-as-you-go financed 
plan when this plan would be interpreted as a fictitious funded DB plan. In the following table, panel A, we 
have very roughly estimated the fictitious ABO of the pay-as-you-go financed plans
15. For reason of 
comparing with the funded and book-reserved plans, the value of liabilities is calculated on a fair value 
basis (swap rate) and using a fixed discount rate of 4.5%.  
Book-Reserved Public Sector Pension Schemes
16 
Some public sector pension schemes finance their obligations using the book-reserve method.  This 
means that the plan sponsor holds a provision in their balance sheet for the liabilities of the plan, but there 
are no assets that have been set aside in a pension fund to cover these obligations.  Rather, as benefits 
become due, payments are made out of the plan sponsors general budget.  Of the plans that we examined, 
the UK schemes for civil servants, the NHS and teachers are financed via the book reserve method.   
As was done for the plans with pension fund assets in the previous section, following are the liabilities 
of the book-reserved plans on the reported basis, the fair value basis (using a market discount rate), and 
using a fixed discount rate of 4.5%: 
                                                      
15 This estimation has been done using the annual benefit payments of the plans in recent years as reported by the 
plans themselves. For an accurate determination of the ABO, we also need to have knowledge first of the 
future cash flows based on accrued rights from past years of service, and secondly knowledge of the 
actuarial principles (e.g. mortality tables, career parameters) and the current composition of the scheme 
members regarding age and gender as these aspects determine the present value factors needed to 
“translate” benefit cash flows into the Benefit Obligations. As we have no knowledge of future benefit cash 
flows nor of present value factors, we have to fall back on rules of thumb that can be derived from the 
practice of real-life public sector pension funds offering benefits of the same kind. 
16 The Australian PSS scheme is partially funded, partially book-reserved, with assets at about 30% of liabilities. The 
Norwegian SPK plan is partially funded, partially book-reserved with assets at about 60% of liabilities.  
These partially funded schemes have been discussed in section 4 on funded public sector pension plans.  
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Table 5.1 Liabilities in pay-as-you-go and book-reserved plans 
  
Panel A Reported   Fair value Liabilities
Benefits value  Discount  liabilities fixed  4.5%
PAY-AS-YOU-GO PLANS 2008 liabilities rate in BEUR as % GDP in BEUR as % GDP
France Fonct.de l'Etat, de magistrats et des mil 45.5 n.a. n.a. 1456 72% 777 38%
Collectivités locales 12.4 n.a. n.a. 397 19% 212 19%
Sum 57.9 1853 91% 989 48%
Germany Civil Servants 28.7 n.a. n.a. 918 35% 490 19%
Other 18.3 n.a. n.a. 586 23% 313 12%
Sum 47.0 1504 58% 803 31%
Sweden Local governments n.a. 31 n.a. 27 7%
Finland Local (KuEL) and Federal (VaEL)  (a) 6.2 n.a. n.a. 148 77% 79 41%
(a) net of funded part
Panel B Reported   Fair value Liabilities
Benefits value  Discount  liabilities fixed  4.5%
BOOK-RESERVED PLANS 2008 liabilities rate in BEUR as % GDP in BEUR as % GDP
UK Civil Servants 3.9 119 5.25% 157 8% 107 6%
National Health Service 5.0 218 4.60% 262 14% 162 9%
Teachers 4.4 172 6.50% 270 14% 219 12%
Sum 13.3 508 689 37% 777 38%
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Section 6. Net unfunded liabilities across countries 
Funded pension schemes, in principle, accumulate assets to cover the future payments of promises 
when those promises become payable. However, underfunding in funded plans could also be interpreted as 
implicit debt for future generations of tax payers. Underfunding implies that accrued pension rights are not 
matched in full by adequate funding now so future tax payers may have to step in to cover financial 
shortfalls. The residue position as percentage of GDP as reported in table 4.3, panel D can be interpreted as 
the implicit debt of future tax payers in funded plans. Table 4.5 in principle is the implicit debt position of 
the book-reserved scheme.  
Figure 6.1 ties all information together of all the examined plans per country in order to get some 
perspective on the net unfunded liabilities on a fair value basis. Now we can compare the different 
examined plans, grouped by country, as to the fiscal burden for future tax payers in one dimension. In 
principle this fiscal burden, this implicit pension debt, can be replaced by explicit government debt, when 
the governments would turn to the capital market and borrow the money to back all unfunded pension 
promises made in the past up to now to public sector workers.  However, to the extent that prefunding of 
government pension promises leads to investment in domestic government bonds, a circularity in 
government funding could be created. 
The examined plans in France, Finland, the United Kingdom and Germany rank the highest in terms 
of net unfunded liability, with the French level reaching over 90% of GDP and the Finnish one over 75% 
of GDP. The net unfunded liabilities in Sweden, the Netherlands (ABP and PfZW together), Canada (only 
public servants) are low due to the relatively high funding levels in the examined funded plans. The 
examined plans in the United States (all state and local plans) and Norway fall in the middle. 
The reported evidence reflects the actual size of the net unfunded liabilities best for France, Finland, 
United States, Norway, Sweden and the Netherlands as the examined plans in these countries cover more 
than 90% or even 100% of the active public sector employees (compare figure 3.1). For the United 
Kingdom, there is underreporting of the total net unfunded liabilities position as the considered plans cover 
less than 60% of the active workers in the public sector. This is also the case for Germany and even more 
so for Canada, as the reported Canadian plans represent about 10% of the total public sector workforce.  
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Section 7 Public sector plans and creditworthiness of countries  
The credit crisis has made manifest that countries may default on meeting payment obligations of 
their explicit government debt. The reported net unfunded liabilities of public sector plans in Figure 6.1 
can be interpreted as implicit government debt. The market would be expected to take also this implicit 
debt in consideration when evaluating the creditworthiness of a country. The market assessment of 
countries’ creditworthiness can be derived from the market for credit default risk. Table 7.1 below reports 
for the countries under study the premium for the sovereign risk derived from the credit default swap 
(CDS) market, the explicit government debt position end 2009 for these countries, the net unfunded public 
sector liabilities (implicit pension debt) and the sum of the two debt positions. We are aware of the small 
number of countries in this sample, but nevertheless we have calculated the correlation between the CDS-
premia and the debt positions.  
The correlations between the premiums and, respectively, the implicit
17, the explicit and the total debt 
positions are 0.58, 0.76 and 0.68. So there is strong positive correlations between CDS premia and the 
implicit pension debt, but the correlation with the explicit debt is a bit higher, and so with the total debt. 
While the correlation between the implicit pension debt and the CDS premia may be driven by the explicit 
debt-CDS link, Table 7.1 also serves to highlight that some of the countries with the larger debt to GDP 
ratios also carry large unfunded pension liabilities for public sector workers.  
                                                      
17 The reported implicit debt positions in table 7.1 do not cover all public sector workers (compare figure 3.1). The 
correlations are calculated for a crude estimation of the total implicit debt by adjusting the reported implicit debt with 
an appropriate multiplier.  
  33
Table 7.1: Credit swap rates and government debt 
 
CDS 2008 2009
(bpt) Implicit debt Explicit debt  Total debt
France 123 91 61 152
Finland 44 77 38 115
UK 84 63 75 138
Germany 74 58 44 102
US 59 31 53 84
Norway 33 19 26 45
Sweden 44 8 38 46
Netherlands 74 5 50 55
Canada*) - 5 36 41
Correlation 
with CDS 0.58 0.76 0.69
*) No CDS premium available  
Source: Datastream, authors’ calculations 
The impact of pension promises of government finances will also increase in the coming decades as 
demographic ageing continues, leading to increases in the ratio of retirees to workers. As shown in Figure 
7.1, all the countries reviewed, with the exception of the United States, are expected to have old-age 
dependency ratios (the number of persons 65 years and older per one hundred persons 15 to 64 years) 
greater than 40. 
Such demographic trends will compound the fiscal pressures exerted not only by pension 
arrangements for government workers but more generally by unfunded, social security arrangements for 
private sector workers. As shown in Figure 7.2, public expenditure on pensions is expected to grow 
substantially in some of the countries considered in this report (between 2 and 4 percentage points of 
GDP), such as Finland, Germany, the Netherlands and Norway. However, of these four countries, only 
Finland and Germany also display a large implicit pension debt for public sector workers.  
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Figure 7.2: Increase in public expenditure on pensions as a % of GDP, 2010-50 
 
Source: OECD Pensions at a Glance 2011 
Section 8. Concluding Remarks 
Pension promises for government workers are a major policy challenge for four main reasons. Firstly, 
the state is usually the largest employer in the country and hence it usually faces large commitments to  
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provide pensions for its employees. Secondly, these pension promises, often in the form of defined benefit 
plans, tend to be relatively generous, especially when compared to private sector arrangements.  In some 
cases higher pension promises appear to have been made to make up for lower cash pay in the public sector 
relative to the private sector. Thirdly, these pension plans are in some countries underfunded or paid out 
directly from government revenues (the pay-as-you-go financing mechanism).  Fourthly, there is as yet no 
internationally standardized method of reporting public sector pension liabilities, as there is for exchange-
listed private sector companies in most countries.  The valuation and disclosure of these promises is all too 
often less than transparent, which may be hiding potentially huge fiscal liabilities that are being passed on 
to future generations of workers.  
The aim of this paper is to gather more evidence on public sector pension plans regarding the types of 
pension promises as well as a rough estimate of the future tax burden related to these pension promises for 
a select number of public pension schemes. Most OECD countries have special pension arrangements for 
public sector employees. On average 15% of the labour force in OECD countries is covered by government 
sector pension plans. The plans differ as to their financing base (funding or pay-as-you-go or some kind of 
book reserving), the nature of the promise (predominantly defined benefit plans, although some defined 
contribution plans also exist in some countries), and whether the plans are a complement to or a substitute 
for the country-wide public pension plans (the former is most common). We also find that government 
workers plans tend to be more generous than private sector plans, however Scandinavian plans offer 
similar benefits (and Swedish plans are actually less generous than the plans offered to a large portion of 
the private sector). The countries differ also considerably in the discounting method to value future pension 
liabilities. Methods range from a fixed discount rate based on the expected rate of return to fair value 
principles.  
The paper did not attempt to explain these striking differences across countries. This asks for a broad 
socioeconomic analysis embracing country-specific historical, cultural, and institutional aspects. Instead, 
the research effort was directed at obtaining internationally comparable information on the funding level of 
on a selection of DB plans in different OECD countries. 
A fair comparison between countries regarding the fiscal burden of their DB public sector pension 
plans is hindered by the country-specific use of valuation and reporting methods. In order to arrive at such 
a fair comparison, we have estimated for a number of plans the size of the net unfunded liabilities using a 
market discount rate (“fair value” approach) and using a common fixed discount rate, both as of end 2008.  
This fiscal burden due to underfunding can also be interpreted as the implicit pension debt for a 
government as future generations of tax-payers may have to pay for these underfunded accrued pension 
promises.  It should be noted, though, that the government sponsorship of these public sector DB plans 
could also be considered an implicit pension asset due to the relatively longer time horizon of the 
government plan sponsor and its potentially stronger level of creditworthiness as compared to plan 
sponsors in the private sector.  
The limitations of the study should be considered. Not all pension plans for public sector workers 
were examined in each country. In France, Finland, Netherlands, Norway and Sweden, the plans analysed 
cover most (over 85%) of public sector employees, so the plans can be considered representative of the 
public sector.  On the other hand, for Canada, the implicit liabilities calculated only refer to plans covering 
10% of the public sector, while the equivalent figure for Germany and the United Kingdom is about 50%.  
Furthermore, in estimating the liabilities on a fair value basis, we made a series of assumptions (such 
as their duration) as detailed actuarial information on the plans surveyed is not available. Irrespective of the 
valuation method used (actuarial or fair value), calculations of funding ratios, and the net unfunded 
liabilities are also subject to the potential criticism that they are based on a given set of assumptions that  
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may not represent accurately the long-term financial challenge faced by governments in meeting their 
pension commitments on an ongoing basis. For instance, the use of market discount rates, as in the fair 
value approach, incorporates the erratic and not always rational behaviour of capital markets in the 
calculation of long-term pension commitments. 
One key policy message from this study is that better disclosure and transparency is needed over the 
commitments made by governments to their public sector employees. While general social security 
systems are under increased scrutiny, information on public sector arrangements is often partial or not 
readily available. An international debate should also be opened on how to compare these commitments 
internationally, in order to assist the understanding of their fiscal impact. This paper has attempted to make 
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